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The federal government’s power to engage in 
surveillance for national security purposes is extensive. In 
an effort to reform the current national surveillance 
regime, scholars have called for, among other things, the 
creation of a “special advocate” to counter the 
government’s arguments before the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. Feeling political pressure to improve 
an ever-unpopular national surveillance regime, 
lawmakers passed the USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom 
Act”). 
Section 401 of the Freedom Act provides for the 
creation of an “amicus curiae,” a position that differs from 
earlier conceptions of a “special advocate” in important 
respects. This Essay examines those differences, and 
counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus 
curiae with a true special advocate. By doing so, this Essay 
highlights the need for continued calls for a special 
advocate. 
  
                                                                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like 
to thank Professors Ashley Deeks, Ryan Calo, and Michael Livermore for their 
feedback on earlier drafts of this Essay. All errors are my own. 
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As surveillance technologies continue to evolve, a lawyer’s 
ability to employ both legal and technical skill has become an 
increasingly important attribute. To properly represent her client 
before a tribunal considering advanced surveillance technologies, a 
lawyer must be capable of incorporating complex technological 
issues into persuasive legal arguments. When it comes to many 
national security issues, however, a lawyer rarely gets to make her 
case. This is because many national security decisions are made 
outside of a traditional adversarial setting. Often, only the 
government’s argument is considered. 
In an effort to reform the current national surveillance regime, 
scholars have long called for the creation of a “special advocate.”1 
While there have been various proposals, the general idea is that an 
advocate would represent the interests of the public before the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)—the “secret” 
court charged with overseeing government requests to collect data 
for national security purposes.2 Presently, the FISC operates on an 
                                                                                                             
1 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA ‘Special Advocate’, 2 
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing proposals). Throughout the 
remainder of this Essay, “special advocate” will be used to refer to similarly 
named proposals such as “public interest advocate” unless otherwise noted. 
2 ANDRE NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, INTRODUCING A 
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ex parte basis, meaning it grants or denies a government request to 
collect data after considering the government’s argument.3 
Inserting a special advocate into this process would allow the FISC 
to hear arguments both for and against a given government request, 
imitating the adversarial proceedings common in other American 
courtrooms. 
Arguments in favor of inserting someone to argue against a 
government lawyer presenting her case before the FISC were 
bolstered when it was revealed that the FISC had rarely denied a 
government request.4 Feeling political pressure to do something to 
improve an increasingly unpopular national surveillance regime, 
Congress halfheartedly answered the calls for a special advocate 
by passing the USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom Act”).5 This Essay 
will focus on one specific aspect of the Freedom Act: the creation 
of an “amicus curiae,” or “friend of the court” under Section 401.6 
As this Essay will explain, the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae is 
essentially a watered-down version of the type of special advocate 
discussed above. 
In Part I, this Essay will argue that the creation of a special 
advocate is desirable. Part II will then examine the various ways in 
which the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae falls short of providing the 
                                                                                                             
PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT’S 
COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2013). 
3 Orin Kerr, A Rule of Lenity For National Security Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 
1513, 1521–24 (2014). 
4 Dina Temple-Raston, FISA Court Appears To Be Rubber Stamp For 
Government Requests, NPR (June 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2013/06/13/191226106/fisa-court-appears-to-be-rubberstamp-for-government-
requests. 
5 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268, 
available at https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ23/PLAW-
114publ23.pdf; Frank Thorp V, Obama signs ‘USA Freedom Act’ to reform NSA 
surveillance, MSNBC (June 2, 2015, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/senate-approves-usa-freedom-act-nsa-
surveillance. See Benjamin Wittes & Jodie Liu, So What’s in the New USA 
Freedom Act, Anyway?, LAWFARE BLOG (May 14, 2015, 11:51 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/so-whats-new-usa-freedom-act-anyway 
[hereinafter New USA Freedom Act], for a helpful analysis of the Freedom Act. 
6 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 
279–81. 
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same benefits that a special advocate would provide. By doing so, 
this Essay counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus 
curiae with a true special advocate, and highlights the need for 
continued calls for such an advocate. 
 
I. THE BENEFIT OF A SPECIAL ADVOCATE 
 
While some scholars have questioned the benefit of a special 
advocate,7 this Essay, like others, adopts the position that such an 
advocate is desirable.8 Part I will first provide a general 
understanding of what a “true” special advocate would look like, 
and will then argue why such an advocate would help improve the 
current national security regime. 
 
A.  What Is a Special Advocate? 
 
A 2013 Congressional Research Service Report generalized 
some of the leading special advocate proposals as being “unified” 
around the idea that the special advocate would have “a range of 
responsibilities, such as being able to intervene in ongoing cases, 
brief the FISC on relevant matters, conduct some forms of 
discovery, file motions seeking discrete forms of relief from the 
court . . . or even appeal an adverse ruling.”9 Similarly, one scholar 
noted that “a common theme” of several proposals was “an 
increase in the opportunities for adversarial litigation,” before both 
the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review (“FISCR”), “to ensure that, even behind closed doors, the 
government’s legal position is debated vigorously.”10 
For the purposes of this Essay, a “true” special advocate is 
therefore one that: (a) has the unencumbered right to participate in 
at least some statutorily defined settings; (b) is properly equipped 
to act as an equal counter-party to the government lawyer 
presenting her case before the FISC; and (c) is afforded some 
                                                                                                             
7 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 3, at 1531–32 (arguing for the adoption of a 
rule of lenity as an alternative to introducing adversarial mechanisms). 
8 See Vladeck, supra note 1. 
9 NOLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. 
10 Vladeck, supra note 1. 
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ability to seek review by the FISCR.11 While the introduction of a 
special advocate would not cure the current national security 
regime of all its ills, Part I.B will address why the introduction of a 
special advocate would be a step in the right direction. 
 
B.  Debate Is Helpful In An Otherwise Opaque Area of the Law 
 
Because the FISC deals with on-going national security issues, 
the inner workings of the court are largely kept “secret.”12 The 
FISC was originally created following the Church Committee’s 
findings of intelligence abuses in the 1970s.13 As one scholar 
stated, “[t]he Executive Branch agreed to have many of its foreign 
intelligence surveillance activities subjected to far greater legal 
oversight and accountability, in exchange for which Congress and 
the courts agreed to provide such oversight and accountability in 
secret.”14 It is precisely because the FISC operates under a layer of 
secrecy that a special advocate is desirable. 
The secretive nature of national security law can result in an 
“echo-chamber,” where similarly situated and isolated actors have 
a reduced opportunity to have their presumptions and conclusions 
tested by “outside” opinions.15 One recent example highlights this 
point. The leaks by former government contractor Edward 
Snowden revealed that the FISC was interpreting Section 215 of 
the Patriot Act broadly, authorizing the government’s bulk 
telephone metadata collection program.16 In the weeks leading up 
                                                                                                             
11 See Letter from The Constitution Project to Speaker of the House et al. 4 
(May 20, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/TCP-Letter-to-House-members-on-FISA-Special-
Advocate-FINAL-SIGNED.pdf. 
12 JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 584 (9th ed. 2015). 
13 S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Foreign and Military Intelligence, 
S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976). 
14 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 2. 
15 See Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National 
Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 285 
(2014). 
16 Orin Kerr, Second Circuit rules, mostly symbolically, that current text of 
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to Congress’s passage of the Freedom Act, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to a different conclusion, 
holding that Section 215 of the Patriot Act did not authorize such a 
widespread surveillance program.17 
While the Second Circuit’s opinion represents just one 
decision, it is revealing that two courts interpreting the same law 
came to such drastically different outcomes, with the FISC 
operating on an ex parte basis and the Second Circuit operating 
within a traditional adversarial setting. One scholar went as far as 
to say that it was not inconsistent for legislators to vote for the 
Patriot Act in 2001, but against the telephone metadata program in 
2015, because “the Patriot Act didn’t authorize bulk surveillance; 
the FISC did, based on a major misreading of the Patriot Act.”18 
One should be careful, however, with conflating such reasoning 
with the notably different proposition that the federal judges who 
serve on the FISC and FISCR are less able to interpret the law than 
their colleagues who do not. The different interpretations of the 
Patriot Act were not a result of a difference in the quality of the 
judging, but rather the quality of the means available for the judges 
to come to an informed decision. 
Just as judges rely on the adversarial system to make an 
informed decision in cases regarding complex securities or patents, 
an adversarial setting can help ensure that judges on the FISC and 
FISCR are properly informed about the constantly evolving 
technologies associated with government surveillance. Judge 
James G. Carr stated that during his “six years on the [FISC], there 
were several occasions when I and other judges faced issues none 
of us had encountered before,” concluding that “[h]aving lawyers 
challenge novel legal assertions in [the FISC’s] secret proceedings 
would result in better judicial outcomes.”19 It is for this reason that 
                                                                                                             
07/second-circuit-rules-mostly-symbolically-that-current-text-of-section-215-
doesnt-authorize-bulk-surveillance/. 
17 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015). 
18 Orin Kerr, How much has Congress changed on surveillance?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/06/02/how-much-has-congress-changed-on-surveillance/. 
19 James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html?_r=0. 
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this Essay counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus 
curiae with a special advocate. Introducing a special advocate into 
FISC and FISCR proceedings can create the adversarial setting that 
judges rely on in a way that an amicus curiae cannot. As Judge 
Carr noted, appointing an amicus curiae “will not achieve true 
reform, which requires appointment of an attorney.”20 While an 
amicus curiae can help inform the court on important issues, Part II 
will examine how the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae falls short of 
providing the same informative benefits that an adversarial special 
advocate could provide. 
 
II. HOW THE AMICUS CURIAE FALLS SHORT 
 
The amicus curiae provided for in Section 401 of the Freedom 
Act is a far cry from the type of special advocate discussed in Part 
I.21 While the Freedom Act should be celebrated for providing the 
FISC and FISCR with the ability to learn from both technological 
and legal experts acting as amicus curiae, it falls short in its ability 
to allow such experts to meaningfully participate in the court’s 
decision-making process. Part II aims to highlight the importance 
of continued efforts to create a true special advocate by revealing 
the limitations of the amicus curiae provided for in the Freedom 
Act.22 Part II will first examine the ways in which the amicus 
curiae can be prevented from playing any role before the FISC and 
FISCR, let alone a minimal one. Second, the way in which the 
Freedom Act curtails the amicus curiae’s ability to successfully 
counter the government’s legal arguments will be addressed. 
Lastly, the limits on the ability for the amicus curiae to seek 
judicial review will be discussed. 
  
                                                                                                             
20 James G. Carr, Fixing what ails the FISA, THE HILL (July 24, 2014, 11:00 
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/213137-fixing-what-ails-
the-fisa. 
21 See Steve Vladeck, The USA FREEDOM Act and a FISA “Special 
Advocate”, LAWFARE BLOG (May 20, 2014, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/usa-freedom-act-and-fisa-special-advocate. 
22 This assumes one is in favor of a special advocate at all. See Kerr, supra 
note 3, for a discussion as to why the FISC should adopt a rule of lenity rather 
than imitate the adversarial nature of a traditional lawmaking court. 
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A.  No Consistent Representation 
 
The appointment procedures described in Section 401 of the 
Freedom Act are split into two scenarios: one in which 
appointment is mandatory, and one in which appointment is 
optional. In the mandatory provision, Section 401 provides that the 
FISC and FISCR  
 
shall appoint an individual . . . to serve as amicus 
curiae to assist such court in the consideration of 
any application for an order or review that, in the 
opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant 
interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a 
finding that such appointment is not 
appropriate . . . .23 
 
Though the use of the word “shall” implies that the court must 
appoint an amicus curiae in the described setting, two exceptions 
are explicitly provided for in the above quoted statutory language 
that allow for the court to opt out of appointing an amicus curiae. 
The first exception to the mandatory appointment provision is 
that the court can simply refuse to appoint an amicus curiae when 
the court deems an appointment is not “appropriate.”24 Privacy 
advocates at the Constitution Project highlighted this clause, 
fearing that it would allow “FISC judges to sidestep [the 
appointment] requirement simply by asserting that such an 
appointment is unnecessary.”25 Of course, if the FISC did decide 
that such an appointment would be inappropriate, the court is 
required to issue a “finding” explaining that it has indeed found 
so.26 It is unclear, however, what a “finding” entails in this context. 
                                                                                                             
23 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(2)(A), 129 
Stat. 268, 279. 
24 Id. 
25 Letter from The Constitution Project to Speaker of the House et al. 3 
(May 20, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/05/TCP-Letter-to-House-members-on-FISA-Special-Advocate-FINAL-
SIGNED.pdf. 
26 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(2)(A), 129 
Stat. 268, 279. 
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If the court merely decides to state that it has concluded that an 
appointment was inappropriate in the case at hand, then the finding 
requirement will be of little practical value. If the court instead 
takes the finding requirement as an opportunity to elucidate the 
court’s internal decisions, doing so would be an admirable attempt 
to bring transparency into an otherwise opaque area of the law. 
Due to the secretive nature of the requests before the FISC and 
FISCR, however, the finding requirement may not reveal much in 
practice. In many of the scenarios in which the FISC or FISCR 
might find it “appropriate” to opt out of the mandatory 
appointment process, one can imagine that the court would decide 
so as a result of the secretive nature of the underlying national 
security information.27 If the FISC or FISCR opts out of appointing 
an amicus curiae because of the secretive nature of the underlying 
information, the court is unlikely to go into much detail in its 
explanation—as doing so might defeat the purpose of opting out of 
an appointment in the first place. 
The second exception to the mandatory appointment provision 
is that Section 401 of the Freedom Act explicitly states that it is a 
matter of the court’s opinion to determine whether “any 
application for an order or review . . . presents a novel or 
significant interpretation of the law.”28 If the FISC or FISCR 
determines that the case at hand does not present a novel or 
significant issue, and the government refrains from objecting to the 
court’s favorable decision, then the amicus curiae would play no 
role at all in that particular proceeding. 
An earlier draft of the Freedom Act proposed by Senator 
Patrick Leahy included language to quell such fears, requiring a 
broad mode of construction when determining what constitutes 
“novel or significant” interpretations of the law.29 Senator Leahy’s 
                                                                                                             
27 This scenario, however, should occur less frequently than one might 
think. This is because Section 401 requires potential amicus curiae to “be 
persons who are determined to be eligible for access to classified information 
necessary to participate in matters before the courts.” Id. 
28 Id.; Jodie Liu, So What Does the USA Freedom Act Do Anyway?, 
LAWFARE BLOG (June 3, 2015, 5:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/so-
what-does-usa-freedom-act-do-anyway. 
29 New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5. 
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statutory language provided: 
An application for an order or review shall be 
considered to present a novel or significant 
interpretation of the law if such application involves 
application of settled law to novel technologies or 
circumstances, or any other novel or significant 
construction or interpretation of any provision of 
law or of the Constitution of the United States, 
including any novel and significant interpretation of 
the term ‘specific selection term.’30 
This language, however, was not adopted, providing the court with 
the ability to more easily opt out of the mandatory appointment 
provision. 
The final version of Section 401 of the Freedom Act also 
provides an optional appointment provision, granting the FISC and 
FISCR the ability to appoint an amicus curiae “in any instance as 
such court deems appropriate.”31 As is the case with the mandatory 
appointment requirement, it will be interesting to see in what 
settings the court deems it “appropriate” to appoint an amicus 
curiae. After the Freedom Act takes effect, further research will be 
necessary to reveal how often this optional appointment method is 
deployed, and whether there is a correlation between the court’s 
optional appointment of an amicus curiae and the court’s decision 
to deny a government request. 
 
B.  Curtailment of Ability to Counter Legal Arguments 
 
Unlike earlier proposals for a special advocate, the Freedom 
Act’s amicus curiae is provided with substantially restricted access 
to necessary information.32 While the Freedom Act provides that 
the amicus curiae “shall have access to any legal precedent, 
application, certification, petition, motion, or such other materials,” 
                                                                                                             
30 S. 2685, 113th Cong.§ 401(i)(3) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy), 
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN14602.pdf.  
31 S. 2685, 113th Cong.§ 401(i)(2)(B) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy), 
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN14602.pdf. 
32 See New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5. 
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access to at least some of those materials is limited to those “that 
the court determines are relevant to the duties of the amicus 
curiae.”33 Similarly, the amicus curiae “may have access to 
classified documents, information, and other materials or 
proceedings only if that individual is eligible for access to 
classified information and to the extent consistent with the national 
security of the United States.”34 In addition, Section 401 of the 
Freedom Act explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to require the Government to provide information to 
an amicus curiae appointed by the court that is privileged from 
disclosure.”35 
Compare the hedged access provided to the Freedom Act’s 
amicus curiae to the language within Congressman Adam Schiff’s 
proposed legislation that provided for a “public interest advocate” 
with “access to all relevant evidence in such matter [for which the 
advocate was appointed].”36 Congressman Schiff’s proposal also 
provided the public interest advocate with the ability to “petition 
the court to order the Federal Government to produce documents, 
materials, or other evidence necessary to perform the duties of the 
public interest advocate.”37 Similarly, a Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board report suggested that “[o]nce a Special Advocate 
has been invited to participate with respect to an application or 
other matter, the Special Advocate . . . should have access to all 
government filings.”38 
With restricted access to necessary information, the amicus 
curiae could end up being little more than a shell of its intended 
                                                                                                             
33 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(6)(A)(i), 129 
Stat. 268, 280 (emphasis added).  
34 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(6)(C), 129 
Stat. 268, 280 (emphasis added). 
35 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(6)(D), 129 
Stat. 268, 280 (emphasis added). 
36 H.R. 3159, 113th Cong., § 2(b)(i)(3)(C) (2013). 
37 Id. 
38 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE 
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT, 186 (2014), available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pclob-
215.pdf (emphasis added). 
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purpose. Indeed, without the necessary information to develop an 
informed opinion, the amicus curiae cannot even properly brief the 
court, let alone provide an adversarial check against the 
government. Withholding information from the amicus curiae 
therefore represents one way in which the position is less useful 
than even a traditional amicus curiae, let alone a special advocate. 
Outside of the Freedom Act, a traditional amicus curiae would 
typically have access to much of the preliminary briefing and other 
docket materials in a given case. Because of the secretive nature of 
the underlying information in a given proceeding before the FISC 
or FISCR, however, the amicus curiae provided for in the Freedom 
Act may not even have the ability to obtain those basic documents. 
 
C.  Limits on Judicial Review 
 
The final aspect of the Freedom Act to be examined in this 
Essay regards the amicus curiae’s reduced role in FISCR review of 
FISC decisions.39 An earlier version of the Freedom Act required 
the court to “designate a special advocate to serve as amicus curiae 
to assist [the FISC or FISCR] in the consideration of any 
certification pursuant to subsection (j).”40 The referred to 
subsection (j) provided: 
After issuing an order, [the FISC] shall certify for 
review to the [FISCR] any question of law that the 
[FISC] determines warrants such review because of 
a need for uniformity or because consideration by 
the [FISCR] would serve the interests of justice. 
Upon certification of a question of law under this 
paragraph, the [FISCR] may give binding 
instructions or require the entire record to be sent up 
for decision of the entire matter in controversy.41 
                                                                                                             
39 See Liu, supra note 28; New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5. 
40 S. 2685, 113th Cong., § 401(i)(2)(A) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. 
Leahy), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
HEN14602.pdf. 
41 S. 2685, 113th Cong., § 401(j) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy), 
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN14602.pdf. 
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While the final version of the Freedom Act provides for some 
FISCR review of the FISC,42 it does not contain the provision 
calling for the amicus curiae to assist in the FISC’s consideration 
of whether certification to the FISCR is warranted.43 Suggesting 
that such a change was more than a mere oversight, the final 
version of the Freedom Act also provides for Supreme Court 
review of the FISCR, but explicitly states that “[u]pon certification 
. . . the Supreme Court of the United States may appoint an amicus 
curiae . . . to provide briefing or other assistance.”44 
Limiting the amicus curiae’s role in FISCR review restricts the 
ability of the amicus curiae to influence the FISC’s legal 
interpretations over the long term. The Freedom Act’s amicus 
curiae is only appointed to provide “legal arguments” or 
“information” when the court deems it “appropriate.”45 Compare 
these duties with, for example, Congressman Schiff’s proposal, 
which called on the public interest advocate to “participate fully in 
the matter before the court for which such public interest advocate 
was appointed with the same rights and privileges as the Federal 
Government.”46 
The discrete duties outlined in the Freedom Act, combined 
with the requirement that the court designate “not fewer than [five] 
individuals to be eligible to serve as amicus curiae,”47 results in 
limiting the amicus curiae’s ability to influence the court to a 
volatile series of one-off arguments. A special advocate, who could 
participate in the FISC’s consideration of whether certification to 
the FISCR is warranted, would have the opportunity to help shape 
national security law over the long-term in instances where there is 
                                                                                                             
42 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(j), 129 Stat. 
268, 280–81. 
43 See Liu, supra note 28; New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5. 
44 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(k)(2), 129 Stat. 
268, 281. 
45 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(4)(A)–(B), 
129 Stat. 268, 279. 
46 H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(i)(3)(A) (1st Sess. 2013), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3159/text. 
47 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(1), 129 Stat. 
268, 279. 
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“a need for uniformity.”48 Restricting the influence of the amicus 
curiae to one-off arguments provided by a rotating cast of 
designees falls short of accomplishing the same. As Judge Carr put 
it, “[f]ailure to appoint counsel for the targets [of government 
surveillance] will silence the advocate’s voice when it most must 
be heard—on appeal. Enabling adversarial appellate review is 
crucial to increased confidence in the FISC and its work.”49 
Allowing a special advocate to play a role in determining whether 
review is warranted would increase the likelihood that more than 
one side of the issue is presented before the FISC interprets 
important national security provisions, an opaque area of law 




The amicus curiae provided for in the final version of the 
Freedom Act is a far cry from the “special advocate” that scholars 
originally proposed. By addressing the various ways in which the 
amicus curiae’s duties are restricted, this Essay has counseled 
against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae with a true 
special advocate. While the amicus curiae provided for in the 
Freedom Act is a step in the right direction, continued calls for a 
special advocate are warranted. National security issues often 
involve the application of complex legal principles to novel 
technologies. The type of special advocate argued for in this Essay 
is better equipped to balance those overlapping legal and 
technological concerns in a way that the Freedom Act’s amicus 
curiae cannot. 
                                                                                                             
48 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(j), 129 Stat. 
268, 280–81. 
49 Carr, supra note 20. 
50 See Benkler, supra note 15, at 285 (referring to the “national security 
system’s echo-chamber”). 
14
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol11/iss3/4
